Intensive Correction Order Made Against Officer Who Illegally Shared Restricted Data

The Law Enforcement Conduct Commission has found that NSW police leading senior constable Housam Khatib, who was recently sentenced to a three year intensive correction order (ICO) over accessing and disclosing confidential police information, has indeed conducted serious misconduct, however it found that he didn’t share any of the information with criminal associates.

The internal police investigation into Khatib commenced in March 2023, following concerns being raised that suggested the leading senior constable had been “misusing police information systems” and “providing confidential police information to criminal associates”. Khatib told the LECC in March 2024 that he had accessed the information but only for the benefit of “friends and relatives”.

A decorated officer, Khatib, then 33, was charged with multiple offences in March 2024, and on standing trial this year, he faced four counts of misconduct in public office and nine counts of accessing restricted data without authorisation. This came to pass after Strike Force Kissinger found Khatib had accessed information and shared it between November 2019 to January 2023, while at Revesby police station.

The sole NSW police watchdog’s report on officer Khatib, Operation Feronia, was released on 3 September 2025, and the NSW Police Force responded on 23 September 2025 to outline that it is now undertaking measures to ensure that “unlawful access and disclosure of confidential NSWPF information” does not continue to occur.

Judge Gina O’Rourke handed Khatib the 3 year ICO in May 2024, which included a condition that he perform 400 hours of community service and comply with a 12-month curfew. Downing Centre District Court heard that the well-respected officer shared information regarding victims of crime, persons of interest and witnesses on 27 occasions as he wanted to appear “important and powerful”.

Convicted on all charges

In October 2023, the LECC first received information from the NSWPF that suggested officer Khatib “had improper associations with people known to have significant criminal history, some of which had not been declared to the NSW Police Force and was assisting an associate to supply drugs by providing a police escort, using his Highway Patrol vehicle whilst on duty, to vehicles carrying drugs”.

Operation Feronia commenced on 26 October 2023. The main reason for the LECC pursuing the matter, which was being dealt with by the NSWPF, was “to examine the extent of and motivation for officer Khatib accessing and disclosing… confidential police information”. And suspicions were later raised as to whether Khatib might be financially benefiting from his unauthorised disclosures.

NSW Police Professional Standards Command executed a warrant at Khatib’s house on 12 September 2023. The officer’s electronic devices were seized, and it was confirmed that he’d shared confidential information with “Civilian ZDQ”, along with other friends and family members.

The leading senior constable was then suspended with pay and following his arrest, Khatib was charged with several offences, with additional counts being laid against his name in May 2024.

Khatib was eventually found guilty in respect of four counts of the common law offence misconduct in public office. Common law offences, or judge-made laws, are crimes established via court decisions. These offences are not enacted into statutory law, and the related penalties are said to be “at large”, which means any penalty handed down on conviction is at the discretion of the court.

To prove that Khatib was guilty of this offence, the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he’d wilfully misconducted himself, via an act of omission, without any reasonable excuse and that this conduct was serious enough to warrant criminal punishment.

The ex-police officer also faced nine counts of unauthorised access of restricted data, contrary to section 308H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). This crime carries up to 2 years prison time. To prove this offence, the prosecution had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Khatib had intentionally accessed restricted information without authorisation. And Khatib pleaded guilty to all charges.

Sharing confidential police data

In carrying out its investigation, the LECC requested the audit reports related to officer Khatib assessing the COPS (Computerised Operational Policing System) database, which is the official database of the NSWPF, along with the “digital data from the Cellebrite download conducted by the NSW Police Force on officer Khatib’s mobile phone”.

The first incident that the LECC lists relating to Khatib accessing COPS “for reasons unrelated to his policing issues” took place in June 2020 and involved his accessing files related to his ex-partner. He also accessed information on cases, associates, vehicle registration and property ownership. The officer was too found to have accessed data to pass to others 20 times, including 11 times to ZDQ.

The LECC interviewed ZDQ in March last year. ZDQ was 46 years old at the time of giving evidence, and he owned a business located on Dharug land in Bankstown. ZDQ said he only directly asked Khatib for information once in relation to the “Sefton case” to find out whether the suspect was a dealer or was innocent, and he then discussed these details with his friends.

In November 2019, Khatib passed on an intelligence briefing relating to two organised crimes groups then said to be in conflict, without any request from ZDQ, who actually knew some of the suspects in the brief and told Khatib there was no disagreement between gangs. Khatib then passed on a photo of ZDQ’s wife’s brother from a briefing that related to the man having assaulted police.

Khatib supplied ZDQ with numerous photos from briefings. One included a photograph of an individual stealing something from ZDQ’s shop. ZDQ told the LECC he didn’t discuss any of this information with other people. And Khatib also sent a copy of a NSW police tasking sheet to his brother-in-law.

A lack of understanding

The LECC found that the autonomy afforded officers in the Traffic and Highway Patrol Command, like Khatib, provides them with increased opportunity to access COPS information in an unauthorised manner. The watchdog added that the case further highlighted the need to improve detection and deterrence in terms of police officers accessing police databases without authorisation.

On interviewing Khatib, the watchdog found he didn’t have a clear idea why he’d been sharing information, and he didn’t agree that he’d been doing it on a regular basis. The commission further concluded that he’d done this largely out of personal curiosity, a desire to assist family, friends and associates, and that it was not for personal gain or criminal contacts.

The officer is understood to have naively been sharing classified information to others without contemplating the dangers involved in doing so, as he trusted the recipients not to pass on the information, and he also admitted to passing on the address of the thief who stole from ZDQ, without any consideration for consequences and in full understanding that his associate was angry.

And according to court authorities, “the gravity of misconduct in public office offences by police officers” is “enormous”.

Declaring associations

The report further raised that NSW police officers are required to disclose their associates to the NSWPF if they’ve engaged in unacceptable conduct in respect of the law enforcement agency. This stipulation includes people with criminal histories, those who engage in social drug use or are linked to a criminal organisation.

Khatib told police about ZDQ. But he didn’t inform it about his relative REF1, who has numerous convictions. Khatib had stopped talking to REF1 at the time of applying for his position, but they’d become reacquainted again, while he also accessed charge information about REF1 and continued to speak with him. And Khatib admitted he should have disclosed another association with REF3.

Serious misconduct

The LECC outlines towards the end of its report that it “is satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that officer Khatib accessed confidential NSW Police Force information without authority or lawful excuse on 19 occasions between 1 June 2020 and 10 September 2023”. The watchdog is further satisfied in finding that Khatib passed on the information to ZDQ 11 times and to others 12 times.

But the commission was also clear that Khatib wasn’t attempting to provide information to criminal associates to benefit them. However, this does not take away from the fact that his actions are contrary to community expectations, have breached points 8 and 9 of the NSW Police Force Code Conduct and Ethics, along with having breached clause 76 of the Police Regulations 2015 (NSW).

In terms of a finding of serious misconduct, the LECC outlined that it involves the potential for an officer to be prosecuted over a “serious offence” or “serious disciplinary action”. A serious offence is one that carries over 5 years prison time, while serious disciplinary action means that an officer could have their employment terminated, be demoted or have their rank reduced.

The police watchdog was “satisfied to the requisite standard that the conduct of officer Khatib” warranted serious disciplinary action, and it considered “that a finding of serious misconduct should be made on this basis”.

The LECC further found that as so many NSW police officers have access to classified information that should not be shared with the public that general deterrence was paramount in terms of Khatib’s sentencing. General deterrence is a sentencing principle that aims to prevent crime via imposing severe penalties upon the convicted to deter others from mimicking their crime.

Prosecution, sentence and dismissal are all factors that play a part in deterring others from the commission of a crime being considered before the court. The LECC further considers that the imposition of the three-year ICO, with its accompanying conditions, serves to demonstrate the serious nature of Khatib’s wrongdoing. Therefore, the court’s punishment of Khatib was adequate.